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territory. Nevertheless, for the reasons given in paragraph 3 of the Foreign Office letter of the 28th January, Sir Austen Chamberlain thinks that an appeal by China to the League, however ill-founded, would merely add complication to an already baffling problem, and ought not lightly to be provoked.
In the second place, it is true that, were a pacific blockade declared, there would probably be no difficulty in dealing with the ships of such Powers as joined in the blockade, and a case could be made out for stopping Chinese ships also, for, since the present difficulty is largely due to the fact that the Canton authorities are taking action in violation of treaties between China and other countries, and the Central Government is quite unable to prevent such action, it would be difficult for the Chinese Government to make an effective protest against the steps taken to bring the Canton authorities to reason. Where difficulty would arise would be as regards the ships and trade of States not participating in the blockade-in particular, Russia, but also probably the United States. The question as to the right, in the event of a pacific blockade, to interfere with the ships of third States is one upon which no definite rules can be said to have been established. It is, however, safe to say that His Majesty's Government could not maintain that there was an established right to interfere with the ships of third States, although there are precedents and arguments which could be invoked in support of such a claim. A State like Russia, which wanted to make trouble, would therefore be in a position to maintain, with some show of reason, that the action of His Majesty's Government was illegal, and could make it a basis of a claim for compensation, even if it were not worth her while to go further and claim that she was entitled to regard it, if she saw fit to do so, as an act of war. The position would be the same, whichever of the three possible methods of dealing with the ships in question were adopted, viz.: (1) to seize and condemn them as prize; (2) to seize and detain them until the conclusion of the blockade and then to restore them; and (3) merely to turn them back and prevent them from entering the port. The possibility of serious trouble would, of course, vary according as one or other of these three courses were adopted.
3. It is clear, therefore, that, even assuming that all the interested Powers were willing to take joint action as proposed, there would still be serious difficulties from the legal point of view. In actual practice these difficulties would be almost insuperable, for there could be no hope whatever of securing the collaboration not merely of all the interested Powers, but even of the more important of them, especially of the United States of America. This has been clearly demonstrated by the attitude taken up by the Powers in regard to the recent customs incident at Canton. It is evident from Sir R. Macleay's telegram No. 73 of the 24th February, a copy of which was sent to your Department in Foreign Office letter of the 26th February, that the Powers were most reluctant to undertake to take even the first step of preventing their national ships from loading and discharging cargo otherwise than through the Maritime Customs, and this, in a matter which, being as it was a threat to the Customs administration itself, was a direct and vital concern as much to them as to His Majesty's Government.
4. Mr. Secretary Amery will also have noted the statement of the United States Minister reported in Sir R. Macleay's telegram No. 78 of the 25th February (see Foreign Office letter of the 26th February), that the United States Government would resent any attempt on the part of His Majesty's Government to lead them beyond the particular customs issue into siding with them in their difficulties with Canton, and took strong exception to any suggestion for a peaceful blockade of Canton with the object of bringing the anti-British boycott to an end. In view of this statement, it would, in Sir Austen Chamberlain's opinion, be impracticable to attempt, as suggested in the telegrams from the Governor of Hong Kong of the 23rd and 26th February, enclosed in your letters of the 25th and 27th February, to refuse to regard the customs incident as closed and to use it in order to enlist the support of the Powers in fighting the anti-British boycott. It would be wiser, therefore, to keep the two issues strictly separate, and Sir Austen Chamberlain regards it, in fact, as a matter for congratulation that the customs incident was satisfactorily closed before it could raise other and more dangerous issues, and lead possibly to a disintegration of the Customs administration. He hopes, however, that it has served to weaken the authority and to lower the prestige of the Strike Committee, and that in this way the end of the boycott may have been brought appreciably_nearer.
I am, &c.
GEORGE MOUNSEY.
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